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Abstract
Historical narratives typically associate ﬁnancial crises with credit expansions and asset price
misalignments. The question is whether some combination of measures of credit and asset prices
can be used to predict these events. Borio and Lowe (2002) answer this question in the afﬁrmative
for a sample of 34 countries, but the question is surprisingly difﬁcult to answer for individual
developed countries that have faced very few, if any, ﬁnancial crises in the past. To circumvent
this problem, we focus on ﬁnancial stress and ask whether credit and asset price movements can
help predict it. To measure ﬁnancial stress, we use the Financial Stress Index (FSI) developed by
Illing and Liu (2006). Other innovations include the estimation and forecasting using both linear
and endogenous threshold models, and a wide range of asset prices (stock and housing prices, for
example). The exercise is performed for Canada, but the methodology is suitable for any country
that ﬁts the above description.
JEL classiﬁcation: G10, E5
Bank classiﬁcation: Credit and credit aggregates; Financial stability
Résumé
Dans les analyses historiques, on associe généralement les crises ﬁnancières aux périodes
d’expansion du crédit et aux déséquilibres de prix sur le marché des actifs. Par conséquent, un
groupe de variables réunissant à la fois des mesures du crédit et du prix des actifs pourrait-il servir
à prévoir les crises? Borio et Lowe (2002) répondent à cette question par l’afﬁrmative sur la base
d’un échantillon de 34 pays. La réponse est loin d’être claire, toutefois, dans le cas isolé d’un pays
développé qui a peu ou pas connu de crises ﬁnancières dans le passé. Les auteurs contournent la
difﬁculté en mettant plutôt l’accent sur le concept de tensions ﬁnancières, mesurées au moyen de
l’indice mis au point par Illing et Liu (2006), et examinent si les mouvements du crédit et du prix
des actifs peuvent aider à prédire l’apparition de telles tensions. Entre autres innovations, ils
procèdent à l’estimation de modèles linéaires et de modèles à seuils endogènes faisant intervenir
un large éventail de prix d’actifs (comme ceux des actions et des maisons), de même qu’à
l’élaboration de prévisions à l’aide de ces modèles. Ils étudient plus précisément le cas du
Canada, mais leur méthodologie se prête à l’analyse de la situation de tout pays développé n’ayant
jamais traversé de crise ﬁnancière.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G10, E5
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Crédit et agrégats du crédit; Stabilité ﬁnancière  2
1 Introduction 
 
Does a combination of credit expansions and  upward movements in asset prices increase 
the likelihood of financial crises? In spite of the prevalence of these two factors in 
historical accounts of financial crises (e.g. Kindleberger and Aliber (2005)), Borio and 
Lowe (2002, p. 11) note that the empirical work seeking to answer this question is scarce. 
Whatever reasons there may be at a general level, the problem in doing this type of 
analysis for developed countries is compounded by the scarcity of events that would 
qualify as financial crises in those countries.
1 Absence of financial crises does not, 
however, mean that financial systems of developed countries have not, or cannot, come 
under stress, but it does raise the issue of the best way to proceed.   
 
The objective of this work is to answer the question posed for Canada, a country that, in 
Bordo et al. (2001) dating, has not experienced any ‘twin crises’ (banking and currency 
crises) since the beginning of their sample in 1883, and only 4 currency crises since 
1945.
2  These features of the sample, which are, broadly speaking, typical of developed 
countries, preclude a meaningful country-level analysis based on binary indicators of 
crises. Instead, we propose that in such circumstances one focuses on incidences of 
financial stress. In our work we use the Financial Stress Index (FSI), a continuous 
measure of financial stress developed by Illing and Liu (2006). The measure was 
originally developed for Canada, but the methodology is general and can be applied to 
any country. In answering the main question, we consider both linear and nonlinear 
models, since the latter may be more apt at capturing any behavioral asymmetries of 
financial market participants. 
 
Being a small open economy, financial stress in Canada will necessarily be impacted by 
international events; the 1994 peso and 1997 Asian crises being well-known recent 
examples. For this reason, our data set incorporates several foreign variables. However, 
                                                 
1 Bordo et al. (2001, p. 55) define financial crises as episodes of financial market volatility marked by 
significant problems of illiquidity and insolvency among financial market participants and/or by official 
intervention in order to contain such consequences.   
2 For details and dating of crises, see the Appendix to Bordo et al. (2001).    3
international developments will also be felt in many domestic variables. For example, 
Canadian stock prices move in response to expected future earnings of Canadian firms, 
which in turn are largely dependent on international factors such as the economic health 
of Canada’s trading partners or on world commodity prices. In addition, real estate prices 
follow similar patterns across major international cities (e.g. see Shiller (2005, p.19)). As 
a result, many of our variables will necessarily move in response to the ultimate source of 
the stress, be it domestic or international factors. 
 
To preview the main results, we find that within a linear framework, domestic credit 
growth is the best predictors of the FSI at all horizons, resulting in marginally lower 
prediction errors relative to our basecase model, although we do not observe the 
combination of credit and asset prices observed by Borio and Lowe (2002). Our results 
suggest that asset prices tend to be better predictors of stress when we allow for non-
linearities, suggesting that extreme asset price movements have disproportionate impact 
on financial stress. Finally, at the two-year horizon, business credit and real-estate prices 
emerge as important predictors of financial stress, confirming the general findings of 
Borio and Lowe.  
 
The presentation is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the related literature and 
describe the nature of the problem addressed in this paper. Section 3 discusses in detail 
the data used. In Section 4, we describe the model and present our results. The last 
section concludes. 
2  Related literature 
 
Broadly speaking, the present work forms part of the literature attempting to arrive at a 
set of early warning indicators. The general problem in this literature has been to identify 
a subset of macroeconomic and other relevant variables that would help predict the 
probability of a financial crisis.
3  
 
                                                 
3 Sorge (2004) provides an excellent survey of stress-testing literature and its relationship to 
macroeconomic forecasting and early warning signals literature.    4
Borio and Lowe (2002) investigate the usefulness of asset prices as indicators of financial 
crises. The authors establish some stylized facts regarding the behavior of asset prices 
over the last 30 years and conclude that there is a relationship between asset price 
movements, credit cycles and developments in the real economy.  Given this, they asked 
whether a useful indicator of financial crises can be constructed. The exercise performed 
is to assess whether credit, asset prices, and investments, either separately or in some 
combination, can predict financial crises. The methodology used is that of Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999), and it is based on threshold values of each series. The dating of crises is 
taken from Bordo et al. (2001). The key finding is that some combination of asset prices 
and credit gap can help predict crises.  
 
Hanschel and Monnin (2005) focus on the banking sector, and propose an index that can 
be used to measure stress in the Swiss banking sector. The paper then investigates 
whether the values of the index can be predicted by a set of macro-variables.  In assessing 
the latter, the authors follow Borio and Lowe (2002), focusing on the imbalances rather 
than levels of variables.  
 
This paper is related to Hanschel and Monnin’s work since it focuses on a single country 
and investigates the predictive ability of a set of variables for financial stress rather than 
as indicators of crises. In our work, however, the indicator of financial stress used is the 
one developed by Illing and Liu (2006). This indicator is broader-based than in Hanschel 
and Monnin, since it tries to capture stress in the financial system, rather than only 
focusing on the banking sector.  
 
In exploring the forecasting ability of credit and asset prices for financial stress we look 
at both linear and non-linear (threshold) specifications. In the latter, we  follow Borio and 
Lowe (2002) and focus on imbalances rather than levels or growth rates of variables, but, 
rather than specifying the threshold exogenously, in our work the thresholds are 
determined endogenously.   
   5
3 Data 
 
3.1 A measure of financial stress 
 
The Financial Stress Index (FSI) was introduced by Illing and Liu (2006), and represents 
an attempt to arrive at a quantitative assessment of the state of the Canadian financial 
system by aggregating various indicators of financial conditions. These indicators are 
grouped into three categories. The categories and components are as follows:
4  
•  Expected loss: 
o  spread between yields on bonds issued Canadian financial institutions and 
the yields on government bonds of comparable duration 
o  yield spread on Canadian non-financial  corporate bonds 
o  inverted term spread (i.e., the 90-day treasury bill rate minus the 10-year 
government yield) 
•  Risk: 
o    the beta derived from the total return index for Canadian financial 
institutions  
o  Canadian trade-weighted dollar GARCH volatility 
o  TSX GARCH volatility 
•  Uncertainty: 
o   difference between Canadian and US government short-term borrowing 
rates  
o  average bid-ask spread on Canadian treasury bills 
o  spread between Canadian commercial paper rates and  treasury bills rates 
of comparable duration. 
 
In constructing their index, Illing and Liu consider several weighting options, and opt for 
credit weights. Under this approach the importance of individual components 
corresponds to the share of a particular market in the overall credit of the economy.  
 
                                                 
4 See Illing and Liu (2006) for a detailed discussion of rationale behind each component.    6
Figure 1 plots the FSI for the sample period of interest in the present study. Higher values 
of the index indicate higher financial stress. It is of interest to note that even though the 
component parts of the FSI are based on Canadian data, the peaks of the index largely 
coincide with episodes of stress that are international in nature (e.g. stock market crash in 
October 1987, peso crisis in 1994, LTCM crisis in 1998, etc.). This is not surprising, 
given that Canada is a small open economy whose markets are well-integrated 
internationally. As such, it is not insulated from international financial developments. 
Turmoil in international financial markets will be reflected in increased stress in 
Canadian markets. This does not mean that financial stress is not or cannot be 
domestically generated, but it may indicate that the level of ‘internal’ stress is secondary 
to the level of ‘external’ stress that spills over into Canadian financial markets.  To assess 
the importance of external factors in predicting financial stress in Canada, we include a 
set of international explanatory variables described below.  
 
3.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
The explanatory variables are divided into four major categories:
5 
 
•  Credit measures 
o  Total household credit (HouseCR) 
o  Total business credit (BusCR) 
o  Total credit/GDP (CR/Y) 
•  Asset prices 
o  Stock prices (TSX) 
o  Real estate 
  Commercial (nominal - ComREI; real -  Real ComREI) 
  residential (new - New House Price Index; existing - Royal LePage  
Index; average price to personal disposable income ratio 
(AvgP/PDI)) 
o  C$ price of gold (GoldC$) 
                                                 
5 Unless otherwise indicated, the source of the data is Bank of Canada.    7
 
•  Macroeconomic variables 
o  Investment/GDP (I/Y) 
o  GDP 
o  Money (narrow (M1++), broad (M2++)) 
o  Inflation (Total CPI and Core CPI) 
•  Foreign variables 
o  Crude oil 
o  Asset price indices (US, Australia, Japan)
6 
o  World gold price 
o  World GDP
7 
o  U.S. bank credit
8  
o  U.S. Federal Funds rate 
 
The data is quarterly and spans the period 1984 – 2006. The forecasting exercise is 
performed over the period 1996 – 2006. The last observation is 2006Q4. The explanatory 
variables are converted into growth rates, so all variables are stationary.
9 We consider 
both quarterly and annual growth rates, since it is possible that longer-run cumulative 
growth rates in the explanatory variables may contain more information about financial 
stress than quarterly growth rates. In our output we use d=1 to denote quarterly growth 







                                                 
6 These indices are the same ones used by Borio and Lowe (2002). In general, they are  the aggregates of 
stock prices, bond prices, and real estate prices, but the components vary by country depending on data 
availability. The reader is referred to their paper for details.  
7 Source: BIS.  
8 Source: Federal Reserve Board, Table H.8. 
9 Commercial real estate investment is not transformed since it was found to be stationary.   8
4 Models and Results 
 
4.1 Linear Models and Forecast Evaluation 
 
In order to evaluate the marginal contributions of the various explanatory variables, we 
compare all our models to a simple linear benchmark, whereby the current FSI is simply 
a function of the k-quarter lagged FSI: 
   t k t t FSI FSI , 1 ε β α + + = −               ( 1 )  
At this time, the explanatory variables will be added to (1) in isolation and in pairs; given 
the multitude of horizons and variables under consideration, this alone results in several 
thousand models to be assessed. The augmented models are thus 
t k t k t t X FSI FSI , 2 1 ε γ β α + + + = − −                                    (2) 
where X is a vector containing one or two explanatory variables. Since we are primarily 
interested in forecast performance, we summarize the forecast performance according to 


























FSI I S F
FSI I S F
rmr               ( 3 )  
where  t t I S F I S F , 2 , 1 ˆ , ˆ  are forecasts of the FSI originating from models (1) and (2), 
respectively. When the rmr is above 1.0 this indicates that the additional explanatory 
variables worsen the forecast performance relative to the base case model; when it is 
below 1.0 the forecast performance is improved.
10 
 
                                                 
10 In comparisons of models that contain the same dependent variable, the above is equivalent to a 
comparison of the adjusted R-squared of these models. The adjustment factor for the R-squared imposes a 
penalty on the inclusion of additional explanatory variables.  The  adjusted R-squared of the resulting 
model will be lowered if the additional variable’s contribution does not exceed the penalty factor. 
Consequently, the ratio of the adjusted R-squared statistics could be greater than 1.    9
To determine whether the ratio of mean-squared errors is statistically less than 1.0, we 
employ a test proposed by McCracken (2004) that can test for equality of the mean 
squared errors of nested models. Let Dt+k denote the difference between the squared 
forecast errors at t+k of the base case model (i.e. the model which includes only the 





, 1 ˆ ˆ k t k t k t D + + + − = ε ε .     (4) 
With  n forecast periods, the statistic for testing the equality of mean squared errors 
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,     (5) 
where R represents the first out-of-sample forecast period (1996Q1). Intuitively, note that 
the numerator represents the difference in mean squared-errors (MSEs) between the 
basecase and alternative model, and the denominator represents the MSE of the 
alternative. If both models produce equally accurate forecasts, then the numerator and 
test-statistic are zero; if the basecase model has a lower MSE, then the statistic will be 
negative, and it will be positive if the alternative has a lower MSE. The distribution is 
non-standard due to the fact that the models are nested, and so we use the critical values 
computed by McCracken (2004). Results presented by McCracken show that this test has 
good size and power for sample sizes as small as 50. Our own application has a sample 
size of 44 (1996Q1 to 2006Q4), so this test should be appropriate for our purposes. 
Instances where the alternative model is found to have a statistically lower MSE than the 
basecase model are highlighted in our figures. 
The details of the forecasting exercise are as follows: 
•  We initially estimate (1) and (2) with data from 1984 to 1996Q1 – k, where k = 1, 2, 
4, 8 or 12; 
•  Using the estimated parameters, we produce a forecasted FSI for 1996Q1;   10
•  We re-estimate the parameters with data from 1984 to 1996Q2 – k; 
•  We use the newly estimated parameters to obtain a forecast of the FSI for 1996Q2; 
•  We continue in this fashion until forecasts have been generated for 2006Q4, for a 
total of 44 forecast periods. 
Note that the above attempts to replicate actual real-time forecasts, whereby the 
forecaster uses data available up to time t to produce a forecast at t+k (or, equivalently, 
data up to t-k to produce forecasts at time t). The issue of data revisions does not apply in 
the case of most of our financial variables as these observations are not revised. However, 
it is known that GDP and monetary aggregates are subject to revision, so some caution 
should be used in interpreting some of these forecast results as the data that we use in 
these particular cases do not produce true real-time forecasts. 
4.2 Threshold Specification 
 
Equation (2) supposes that financial stress is a linear function of asset price movements 
and other variables. However, if one believes that unusually large movements in asset 
prices, credit, monetary expansion, etc. may lead to greater financial uncertainty if, for 
example, herding mentality replaces rational financial decisions, then the relationship 
between some of our explanatory variables and the FSI may be non-linear. We can 
approximate such relationships by allowing for threshold effects between the explanatory 
variables and the FSI, such that the parameters of the models are allowed to differ when 
the explanatory variables lie above or below their threshold values. A similar strategy 
was employed by Borio and Lowe (2002), but the thresholds used in that study were 
explicitly specified by the authors. We employ a more general approach, whereby we 
estimate the threshold values; these endogenous thresholds therefore maximize the 
probability of locating a threshold effect in the data.  
The threshold models take the form 
  t k t k t k t t z X FSI FSI ξ δ γ β α + + + + = − − −
1 1 1 1    for  τ ≤ −k t k z ,                  (6) 
t k t k t k t t z X FSI FSI ξ δ γ β α + + + + = − − −
2 2 2 2  for  τ > −k t k z ,      (7)     11
where z is some variable extracted from the vector X, and ￿ represents the level of z that 
triggers a regime change. We allow for a threshold effect for each of our 24 explanatory 
variables. Superscripts denote the values taken in regimes 1 and 2, respectively.  
To estimate the parameters of the threshold model (6)-(7), we follow Hansen (2000) who 
derives an approximation of the asymptotic distribution of the least squares estimator of 
the threshold parameterτˆ . To understand how the parameters are estimated, we introduce 
an indicator function w and can re-write equations (6) and (7) as a single equation:  
t k t k t k t k t k t k t t Dwz CwX BwFSI Aw z X FSI FSI ξ δ γ β α + + + + + + + + = − − − − − −




















1 2 α α = + A , 
1 2 β β = + B , 
1 2 γ γ = +C , and 
1 2 δ δ = + D . 
  By assuming that τˆ is bounded by the largest and smallest values of the threshold 
variables, we can estimate the parameters in (8) by least squares conditional on a given 
value of τˆ . By iterating through the possible values of τ  in the range of available 
threshold values, we select the τˆ  that minimizes the sum of squared residuals in (8). 
The forecast exercise using the threshold models proceeds in exactly the same manner as 
for the linear models described above, so the parameters and threshold values are re-
estimated each period. The rmr is computed as the ratio of the RMSE from (8) relative to 
the RMSE of a modified version of the simple base case model (1) which allows for 
threshold effects in the lagged value of the FSI. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Linear and threshold models 
 
Given all the combinations of variables, horizons, and specifications, we consider 11520 
models relative to the base case model (1).
11 To summarize these results in the least 
cumbersome manner we present the ratio of root mean squared errors for each horizon (k) 
                                                 
11 24x24 variable combinations, 5 horizons, 2 differencing operators and 2 model specifications: 576 x 5 x 
2 x 2 = 11520.    12
and differencing operator (d) and model specification (linear or threshold) in twenty 
different graphs. This provides a simple visual approach to judge the usefulness of 
various variables. Since the results for d=1 and d=4 are very similar, we place the latter in 
an Appendix.  
 
The forecast performance of the linear models is summarized in Figure 2. To interpret 
these figures, consider Panel (a). The horizontal axis contains labels for all the 
explanatory variables considered (24 variables). When a variable is listed along the 
horizontal axis, this indicates that it is included as the first regressor in the next 24 
models. After each label there are 24 bars, corresponding to the rmrs associated with 
models using different combinations of the labeled explanatory variable with other 
variables. For example, the first variable on the horizontal axis is credit-to-GDP ratio, 
CR/Y. The first bar is the rmr for a model that includes only the CR/Y ratio as an 
additional explanatory variable, so that the estimated model is  
t k t k t t Y CR FSI FSI ε γ β α + + + = − − ) / ( 1 1 . 
The second bar is the rmr for a model including the CR/Y as well as the investment-to-
GDP ( I/Y) variable:  
t k t k t k t t Y I Y CR FSI FSI ε γ γ β α + + + + = − − − ) / ( ) / ( 2 1 1  
The third bar is the rmr for the model 
t k t k t k t t ComREI Y CR FSI FSI ε γ γ β α + + + + = − − − ) ( ) / ( 2 1 1 ,  
etc.  
 
The results associated with different models are assessed against the benchmark value of 
rmr = 1, which indicates that the inclusion of additional explanatory variables did not 
impact the forecasting performance of the base-case model. As stated earlier, rmr>1 
indicates the inclusion of the variable has resulted in deterioration of the forecasting 
performance of the model relative to the benchmark. Finally, rmr < 1 indicates improved 
performance of the new model relative to the benchmark. Models for which the rmr is 
statistically lower than 1.0 according to the McCracken (2004) test are denoted in white. 
   13
Returning to Figure 2 it is clear that the only variable that consistently helps forecast the 
FSI is domestic business credit, although the Fed Funds rate is significant at shorter 
horizons (up to 2 quarters ahead). For both these variables we  find that, regardless of 
which variable they are paired with, they often produce mean squared errors that are 
statistically lower than 1.0. 
 
To understand the effect of business credit on the FSI, we can analyze the estimated 
parameters of the best forecasting models at each horizon, which are presented in Table 
1. We note several interesting results. First, the explanatory power of the lagged FSI 
decreases as the forecast horizon k increases, as evidenced by the adjusted R
2 which 
steadily decreases from 0.58 for k = 1 to 0.00 for k = 12. Second, the Fed funds rate is 
retained in the best forecasting models at the shorter horizons (k = 1, 2), while domestic 
credit is retained at all horizons. Third, the parameters on the credit variables are all 
positive and statistically significant. This signals that a 1% quarterly increase in credit 
will cause the FSI to increase by between 1 and 2 points in the following quarters, which 
signals higher stress. If business credit is expanding this could indicate that financial 
institutions are adding more risk to their balance sheets, and so results in a rise in the FSI. 
Conversely, when business credit falls the opposite occurs. At shorter horizon, the Fed 
funds rate is positively correlated with financial stress in Canada. That result is reversed 
at 1-year horizon, although the parameter is not statistically significant.  
 
The results for threshold models are presented in Figure 3. The interpretation of these 
figures is similar to the linear model, except that in each model a threshold effect is 
allowed in the variable labeled in the figure. For example, the first variable on the 
horizontal axis in Figure 3 is CR/Y, and the first bar is the rmr for the model that includes 
only the CR/Y ratio, with threshold effect, as an additional explanatory variable. The 
second bar is the rmr for the model that allows for the threshold effect in CR/Y, and 
includes I/Y as an additional explanatory variable, etc.  
 
 
   14
The key features of the results in Figure 3, at given horizon k, are as follows: 
  
•  k=1,2 : No single variable appears to universally perform well at forecasting the FSI 
at very short horizons, as evidenced by the large number of black bars in 1-quarter 
ahead forecasting models. The situation improves noticeably 2 quarters ahead, but in 
both cases,  the forecast performance varies according to the specific combinations of 
variables that are retained, as well as the choice of the threshold variable. The best 
forecasting equations at these horizons retain core inflation and GDP, with 
international asset price indices (Australia, Japan) identified as threshold variables 
(Table 2). The rmr at these horizons is quite low indicating a significant 
improvement in forecast performance relative to the base-case model. 
•   k= 4, 8: At these horizons, both business credit and asset prices emerge as significant 
predictors of financial stress. In both cases, a variable related to housing prices 
appears as a significant threshold variable. The rmr in both specifications remains 
quite low, indicating improvements in the forecast performance. For k=8, The 
equation shows that, when house prices rise by more than 13% during a quarter, the 
impact of additional business credit on the FSI rises from 1.1 to 1.6, so business 
credit expansion during a housing boom can add additional financial stress two years 
later. 
•  k=12: At the longer horizons we observe that few variables retain any forecasting 
power, the notable exceptions being the commercial real estate variable. At this 
horizon, commercial real estate investment is the regime-change trigger, while new 
house prices is retained as a significant regressor. Regime effects are quite 
pronounced for this equation, as the signs on both parameters actually change 
depending on which regime we are in. Furthermore, the number of observations in 
each regime are almost equal. When commercial real estate investment is low, 
increases in this variable and in new house prices lower stress; when commercial real 
estate investment is high, increases in these variables increase stress. 
 
Finally, to provide a sense of how these models track the actual data, we plot in Figure 4 
the actual and fitted values of the best linear and threshold forecasting models for k=4, a   15
horizon which could be of interest to policy-makers. In both cases business credit is 
retained as a regressor and we see that, in general, both models perform reasonably well 
in tracking the trend and turning points of the FSI. The improvement of the threshold 
model relative to the linear model centers on the seven observations early in the sample, 
where the threshold model succeeds in picking-up a few extreme movements of the FSI. 
One would therefore conclude that at this horizon business credit offers some hope in 
forecasting the FSI, regardless of the specification used. 
4.3.2 Forecasting models and recent spike in the FSI 
 
August 2007 marks the beginning of the financial turmoil that is still under way. The 
increase in financial stress has been reflected in a sharp increase in the FSI in that period. 
The question is whether the best forecasting models identified in the previous section 
would have picked up the sharp spike in the index. To examine this, we considered the 
following models: 
 
•  Model 1 (threshold):  Average house price/ disposable income, business credit 
•  Model 2 (threshold): TSX and business credit 
•  Model 3 (threshold): oil price and business credit 
•  Model 4 (linear): Fed funds rate and business credit 
•  Model 5 (linear): business credit 
•  Model 6 (linear): Average house price/ disposable income, business credit  
 
Figure 7 (a) – (f) shows the results of this forecasting exercise. In all cases, the models do 
predict an increase in the FSI, but the increase occurs with a lag and generally does not 
match the peak of the FSI. Increase in the forecasted value is due largely  to the inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable, rather than a dramatic changes in the variables retained 
in these specifications.  
 
A closer examination of the behaviour of subcomponents of the FSI
12  reveals that the 
sharp spike in the FSI in August is primarily due to a sharp increase in interest spreads, 
                                                 
12 Figures of the subcomponents of the FSI are available from authors.   16
more specifically the commercial paper spread, and the average bid-ask spread on 
Treasury bills. None of the explanatory variables retained in our best specifications are 
directly related to this component of the FSI. Consequently, we would not expect our 
models to capture sharp increases in the FSI that are driven by non-structural factors.  
 
More generally, one would not expect credit and asset prices to pick up sharp spikes in 
any measure of financial stress. In line with findings in Borio and Lowe (2002), it is the 
financial imbalances (overextension of credit, persistent asset price increases that are not 
sustained by fundamentals) that make financial system vulnerable and increase likelihood 
of financial crises. Each crisis has (at least ex ante) a unique trigger event, which may 
impact the FSI, but will not be predicted by credit and asset price variables. Indeed, it is 
doubtful that any econometeric model can be of much help in predicting these 




The literature on financial stress typically equates financial stress with the occurrence of 
financial crises, and attempts to forecast the latter using different sets of macroeconomic 
variables. This procedure runs into difficulties when applied to countries where financial 
crises are rare or non-existent events, and this is evident especially when the analysis is 
constrained by data availability to the last 25 – 30 years. The absence of financial crises, 
however, does not imply that a country has not been subjected to financial stress in the 
past, or that accumulated financial imbalances could not result in financial crises in the 
future.  
 
To deal with the problem of measurement of financial stress in the absence of financial 
crises, Illing and Liu (2006) constructed a Financial Stress Index. The question we asked 
in this paper is whether a set of explanatory variables commonly considered in the macro 
prudential literature could help forecast financial stress. To do this we have considered 
both linear and threshold models and assessed their performance by  comparing them to   17
the benchmark model in which the future value of the FSI is predicted using only its 
lagged value.  
 
We find that, in line with the macro prudential literature, some combination of credit and 
asset price variables are important predictors of financial stress, although the results 
depend on the type of model used (linear or threshold), and the forecast horizon. As a 
general rule, we find that these indicators offer greater value-added at forecasting the FSI 
than the benchmark model as the forecast horizon increases. A specific indicator worthy 
of being highlighted is business credit, which emerges as the prominent leading indicator 
in both linear and non-linear models at the 1 and 2-year horizons. A combination of this 
variable with a threshold in a housing-sector asset price leads to significant improvements 
in performance over the same horizon. At shorter horizons, the Fed funds rate emerges as 
a predictor of financial stress in linear models. In general, however, international 
variables seem to play a smaller role than one would expect they would in a small open 
economy. 
 
At the one-year horizon, which could be of interest to forward-looking policy-makers, in 
practical terms there is little to distinguish the linear and threshold specifications, as both 
models track the FSI relatively well at this horizon. What matters most is the monitoring 
of business credit, which emerges as an important leading indicator among all variables 
considered in our study.  
 
The empirical results reported here are specific to Canada. Whereas they do confirm 
Borio and Lowe’s findings, on balance business credit seems to play a somewhat more 
important role in forecasting financial stress. A comparative study of determinants of 
financial stress in countries with few or no financial crises would be instructive. The 
methodology proposed in our work is well-suited for that task.    18
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Table 1: In-sample Regression Results, Linear Models, Basecase and Best Forecasting 
Models, d = 1 
Sample: 1984Q1 to 2006Q4 
The basecase model includes only the lagged FSI. RMSE Ratio is the ratio of root mean squared error of the model 
containing exogenous regressors relative to the basecase model. t-statistics corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
 
Variable  k=1  k=2  k=4  k=8  k=12 
Constant  7.66  11.25 14.31 21.21 19.40 28.46 30.43 40.01 45.80 52.19 
  (2.27) (3.56) (3.77) (5.47) (5.62) (7.04) (6.32) (7.80) (8.27)  (10.48) 
FSIt-k  0.75 0.76 0.54 0.54 0.30 0.39 0.04 0.15 -0.19  -0.11 
 (12.29)  (11.42)  (7.23)  (6.53)  (4.31) (4.43) (0.39) (1.49) (-2.09)  (-1.07) 
Business Creditt-k  0.68 -- 1.13 -- 2.13 -- 1.34 -- 1.59 -- 
 (2.54)    (3.32)   (7.47)   (4.08)   (4.64)  
World GDPt-k  -- --  -0.01  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
     (-1.89)          
Japan APIt-k  -- -- -- --   -- -- -- --  0.36  -- 
                (2.76)   
Core CPIt-k  -- -- -- -- -- --  2.29  -- -- -- 
          (3.11)     
Fed Fundst-k  2.07 -- 1.58 -- -2.32 --  --  --  --  -- 
  (1.99)  (5.47)  (-1.11)        
2 R   0.62 0.58 0.41 0.29 0.44 0.14 0.29 0.01 0.35 0.00 
RMSE Ratio  0.92 0.89 0.78 0.87 0.82   20
Table 2: In-sample Regression Results, Threshold Models, Best Forecasting Models, d = 1 
Sample: 1984Q1 to 2006Q4 
Variable  k = 1 k  = 2 k  = 4 k  = 8 k  = 12 
Threshold Variable  Australia API  Japan API  AvgP/PDI  RLePage  Real Com REI 
τˆ   -3.05 -10.49 -5.79  12.93 88.22 
Regime                
42.87  9.44  -4.22 19.25 79.88  21.29  39.65  27.37  190.02  10.72  Constant 
(2.32)  (2.97)  (-0.35) (4.15) (14.18) (6.33)  (8.30)  (2.31)  (10.85) (0.45) 
0.47 0.73 0.22  0.56  0.06 0.24  -0.01  0.49  0.03  -0.28  FSIt-k 
(1.95) (10.56) (0.91)  (6.16)  (0.79)  (3.34) (-0.06) (2.93)  (0.43)  (-2.39) 
-1.41 0.32  COREt-k 
(-1.00) (0.59) 
-- -- --  --  --  --  -- -- 
0.98 0.20  --  --  Australia APIt-k 
(1.84) (1.83)     
-- -- -- --  --  -- 
-2.65 0.09  Japan APIt-k  -- -- 
(-3.45) (0.62) 
-- -- -- --  --  -- 
0.69 0.52  -- --  GDPt-k  -- -- 
(0.44) (1.34)     
-- --  --  -- 
-0.22 2.03 1.09 1.63  Business Creditt-k  -- -- --  -- 
(-0.82) (6.45) (3.32) (2.07) 
 -- 
1.79 0.36  AvgP/PDIt-k  -- -- --  -- 
(13.99) (3.07) 
-- --  --  -- 
-0.50 -0.33  RLePaget-k  -- -- --  --  -- -- 
(-2.25) (-1.27) 
-- -- 
-1.95 0.46  Real Com REIt-k  -- -- --  --  -- -- -- -- 
(-8.31) (2.05) 
-1.18 0.86  New House Pricest-k  -- -- --  --  -- -- -- -- 
(-2.31) (5.02) 
Obs.  11.00 80.00 13.00  77.00  7.00  81.00 70.00 14.00  43.00  37.00 
2 R   0.41 0.60 0.51  0.35  0.95 0.53 0.17 0.53  0.71  0.46 
RMSE Ratio  0.54 0.48 0.54  0.69 0.55 
The basecase model includes only the lagged FSI. RMSE Ratio is the ratio of root mean squared error of the model 
containing exogenous regressors relative to the basecase model. t-statistics corrected for serial correlation and 
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Figure 2: Linear Models, Forecast Performance, d=1 
 (a)  (b) 

































































Significant Insignificant  
 (c)  (d) 
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Figure 3: Threshold Models, Forecast Performance, d=1 
 (a)  (b) 
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Figure 4: Actual and Fitted FSI 
(a) 
Actual & Fitted FSI: Linear Model 
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Appendix 
Figure 5: Linear Models, Forecast Performance, d=4 
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Figure 6: Threshold Models, Forecast Performance, d=4 
 (a)  (b) 



































































Significant Insignificant  
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Figure 7: Forecasts of August 2007 spike in the FSI 
 
 
Actual & Fitted FSI: Threshold Model, 
AvgP/PDI & BusCr. 



























Actual & Fitted FSI: Threshold Model, 
TSX & BusCr.   



























   28
 
Actual & Fitted FSI: Threshold Model, 
Oil & BusCr.    



























Actual & Fitted FSI: Linear Model, 
BusCr. & Fed_Funds 
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Actual & Fitted FSI: Linear Model, 
BusCr.  


























Actual & Fitted FSI: Linear Model, 
BusCr. & AvgP/PDI   
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